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local forum is apt to be most convenient for witnesses, most of whom are probably
local residents.12 Nor will administration in Illinois for the purpose of enabling local
tort claimants to reach the insurer prejudice general creditors of the estate, since the
liability policy is not an asset subject to their claims. Finally, a judgment obtained by
the tort claimants against the ancillary administrator will not affect the domiciliary
3
administration, since the judgment cannot be enforced in Missouri.
Insofar as the instant case is a mechanism by means of which injured persons may
enforce their claims against the local assets of deceased non-resident tortfeasors, it
represents a judicial complement to non-resident motorist statutes. These statutes
have been held to create, for the purpose of service of process, a principal and agent
relation between the tortfeasor and a state official, which is revoked upon the death of
the tortfeasor.14 Consequently, if the tortfeasor has died, the statute is of no benefit to
the tort claimant. But with the expansion of the concept of assets to include even contingent claims of exoneration and indemnification, the injured person, through the device of an administration of the decedent's estates has an effective means of recovery
at least to the extent of the insurer's liability.

Criminal Law-Conditional Pardon-Reservation of Right to Make Ex Parte Revocation-[Federal].-A conditional pardon granted to the petitioner provided that if he
failed to fulfil its conditions he might "by executive order made and entered upon the
Executive Journal, be re-arrested ... , and required to serve out the unexpired term
of .... [his] sentence." The pardon was revoked without notice or opportunity for a
hearing. The petitioner thereupon instituted a habeas corpus proceeding in the county court, claiming that such arbitrary action violated due process, but the Kentucky
Court of Appeals stayed the suit on the ground that the terms of the pardon reserved
to the governor the right to make an ex parte revocation, and that by acceptance of
the pardon the petitioner had consented to its terms.%A similar petition was then filed
in the federal district court, which held that, while in its opinion the terms of the pardon did not reserve the right to make an ex parte revocation, in view of the contrary
determination of this question by the highest court of the state, the writ should not be
12This argument would not be applicable where administration was sought in a state not
the scene of the accident. The other reasons indicated, however, would seem sufficient to support administration. But the court might properly refuse to grant administration where the
only relation between the state and the parties was that the insurer was licensed to do business in that state. But cf. Gordon v. Shea, 3oo Mass. 95, 14 N.E. (2d) io5 (1938).
'3 First Nat'l Bank of Brush v. Blessing, 231 Mo. App. 288, 98 S.W. (2d) 149 (i936);
Johnson v. Powers, 139 U.S. i56 (i8gi); Rosenthal v. Renick, 44 1. 202 (1867).
'4 Donnelly v. Carpenter, 55 Ohio App. 463, 9 N.E. (2d) 888 (x936); Dowling v. Winters,
2o8 N.C. 521, i81 S.E. 751 (1935); Young v. Potter Title and Trust Co., 115 N.J.L. 518, 181
Ati. 44 (i935); State ex rel. Ledin v. Davidson, 216 Wis. 216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934). For a discussion of this restrictive interpretation of non-resident motorists' statutes see Culp, Recent
Developments in Actions against Nonresident Motorists, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 58, 7i (1938).
's Gordon v. Shea, 3oo Mass. 95, 14 N.E. (2d) io5 (1938); Robinson v. Carroll, 87 N.H. 114,
174 Atd. 772 (I934).
z Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v. Hall, 277 Ky.
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issued.2 On certificate of probable cause to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, held, that the state court's interpretation of the terms of the pardon must be
accepted as conclusive, but due process of law requires that the petitioner be granted
a reasonable opportunity to meet the accusation of having violated the conditions of
the pardon. Fleenor v. Hammond.3
In the absence of a statute or an express reservation of the right to make an ex parte
revocation, the conditionally pardoned convict is entitled to a judicial hearing as to
whether he has in fact violated the terms of the pardon.4 Nevertheless, where such an
express reservation has been inserted in a conditional pardon, it has uniformly been
held valid,s and acceptance of the pardon by the grantee has been deemed a waiver of
his right to a hearing.6 The principal case is the first to hold that action in accordance
with an express reservation is violative of due process.
A result similar to that of the instant case could have been reached by the state
court had it decided that the terms of the pardon did not expressly authorize an ex
parte revocation. While the pardon in the principal case appears to waive a judicial
hearing in that the ultimate decision is left with the executive, it is not clear that it was
intended to waive the right to a hearing before the executive officer. Unlike pardons in
which the right of the executive to make an ex parte determination is explicit,7 the pardon in the instant case does not indicate the procedure to be followed by the governor.
Since the terms of a conditional pardon are to be interpreted in the manner most favor2
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F. (2d) 982 (C.C.A. 6th 194).

4 The practice was to bring the conditionally pardoned convict before the court to show
cause why execution should not be awarded against him on his original sentence. He was
awarded a jury trial on the question of identity, and after a finding by the jury that he was the
man previously convicted, he was entitled to be heard as to why sentence should not be passed
upon him. See State v. Home, 52 Fla. 125, 140, 42 So. 388, 393 (i9o6). Statutes permitting
the revocation of a parole or a suspended sentence without a hearing before some competent
body have been declared unconstitutional. People v. Strassheim, 242 Ill. 359, go N.E. xi8
(igog); People v. Moore, 62 Mich. 496, 29 N.W. 8o (1886); see Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490,
493 (1935).

5 Ex parte Frazier, 92 Tex. Crim. 475, 239 S.W. 972 (1922).
6It has been argued that the convict should not be bound by his consent to the terms of the
pardon because of the circumstances under which the consent was given, but lawful imprisonment is not considered duress. Ex parte Wells, 18 How. (U.S.) 307,315 (1855). Courts have,
however, frequently granted a hearing notwithstanding such clauses. See Muckle v. Clarke,
x2 S.E. (2d) 339, 342 (Ga. 194o); State ex rel. Bedford v. McCorkle, x63 Tenn. 1o, zo6,
40 S.W. (2d) ioI5, ioi6 (X931); Ex parte Davenport, iio Tex. Crim. 326, 7 S.W. (2d) 589
(1927). Contra: State ex rel. Rowe v. Conners, 166 Tenn. 393, 6i S.W. (2d) 471 (1933).
7 Cf. Ex parte Frazier, 9i Tex. Crim. 475, 476, 239 S.W. 972 (1922):" ....
if the [petitioner]
is guilty of any misconduct .... or there arises any other good and sufficient reason in the
this pardon is subject to be revoked at the governor's discretion.
opinion of the governor ....
when.... " Ex parte Houghton, 49 Ore. 232, 89 Pac. 8ox (1907): ".. . . the governor ....
ever he is satisfied, by such investigation as he may see fit to make [that the conditions of the
pardon have been violated] may revoke the same without notice, and without the intervention
of any court .......
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ble to the recipient,8 it would seem that the state court should not have construed the
pardon as waiving the petitioner's right to a hearing before the executive.
Given this interpretation, however, the circuit court of appeals was faced with the
problem of determining the validity of the waiver. Previous to the instant case, it was
stated that, since the granting of a pardon is a matter of grace and not of right, a pardon might be made subject to any conditions not illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance.9 It was also said that since the convict would have been required to serve
out his full sentence without further process of law had no pardon been granted, no further process of law is prerequisite to requiring him to serve out his full term by revoking
the pardon10
Strictly speaking, however, the granting of a conditional pardon is not a matter of
grace. As in the case of a suspended sentence or a parole, it signifies a realization that
the interests of society are best served by the imposition of a shorter term of punishment than that originally imposed;" only such restrictions as are consonant with this
aim should therefore be appended. Except insofar as the terms of a conditional pardon
may require of the grantee a higher standard of conduct than that demanded of the
ordinary citizen, its holder, so long as he abides by the conditions, may be considered
as entitled to such benefits as would follow from completion of his term of punishment
and restoration to the status of a citizen.12 Furthermore, since a conditional pardon
may be revoked only in consequence of conduct subsequent to the granting of the pardon, and not upon the basis of the original sentence, it seems clear that the previous
conviction should not affect the petitioner's right to due process in determining the
question of performance or non-performance of the conditions.X3 Provisions limiting
the freedom of action or otherwise requiring a special standard of conduct from the
pardoned convict are justifiable to protect society and insure against any "backsliding" on his part. But society is not better protected by the device of ex parte revocation,14 and it may be suggested that the possibility of the misuse of such power, particularly in connection with political matters, outweighs any possible administrative
advantages.
However salutary the principal enunciated by the circuit court of appeals, its application to the peculiar circumstances of this case might well be criticized.,s Although
8Osbom v. United States, gi U.S. 474, 478 (1875); In re Charles, ii5 Kan. 323, 328, 222
Pac. 6o6, 6o8 (X924); Lee v. Murphy, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 789, 8oo (1872).
9Ex parte Wells, i8 How. (U.S.) 307 (i855); Spencer v. Kees, 47 Wash. 276, gi Pac. 963
(1907); Muckle v. Clarke, 12 S.E. (2d) 339 (Ga. i94o).
x° See Arthur v. Craig, 48 Iowa 264, 268 (1878); Ex parte Hoine, ii Okla. Crim. 517, 523,
148 Pac. 825, 827 (I9-).
11Bonaparte, The Pardoning Power, xg Yale L. J. 6o3 (igio); see Biddle v. Perovich, 274
U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
- Ex parte Rice, 72 Tex. Crim. 587, 597, 162 S.W. 891, goo (i914); see Ex parte Alvarez,
5o Fla. 24, 32, 39 So. 481, 484 (19o5).
13 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Jones v. Commonwealth, 97 F. (2d) 335,
338 (C.C.A. 6th 1938).
'4 Since the arrest may be made prior to the hearing, the right to a hearing does not affect
the speed with which a conditionally pardoned convict suspected of violation of a condition of
his pardon may be taken into confinement.
'S The discharge of the petitioner was made contingent upon the amendment of his petition
to allege unequivocally that if granted a hearing he could show that he had fully complied with
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it is settled that the federal courts have power to discharge a prisoner from the custody
of a state court in order to protect his rights under the federal Constitution, 6 such
power should be employed only in the exercise of a "sound discretion,"7 since it interferes with the orderly processes of the state courts. 8 Inasmuch as state courts are
equally charged with the duty of complying with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 9 only judgments in clear violation of its requirements should be
set aside by the federal courts.20 Moreover, in the instant case one of the conditions of
the petitioner's pardon was that he be "law-abiding"; as a matter of fact, when the
pardon was revoked he was under indictment for murder."
The principal case leaves unanswered the question as to what standard of hearing
will be deemed due process. The precise holding stipulated only that the executive
may not reserve the power to revoke a pardon without a hearing. It appears that a
reservation of power to revoke by executive order after a hearing would be sustained.
To what extent the executive's action must be in conformity with the weight of the
evidence introduced is not indicated. State courts have previously refused to review
the revocation of a conditional pardon where by its terms final determination rested
with the governor, on the ground that he would not be bound by such a review.22 If
the finding of the governor upon hearing is made conclusive regardless of the evidence
introduced, the sole result of the instant decision may be an added formality in the revocation procedure. The present decision may contemplate a review by the courts of
the executive's action, at least to determine whether that action, taken after a hearing,
was arbitrary.23
Income Taxes-Deductions-Expenditure to Affect Legislation Not Deductible[Federal].--In 1924 the taxpayer-respondent was employed by a large part of the German textile interests to secure reimbursement from Congress for property seized under
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.1 The expenses of the undertaking were to be
borne by the taxpayer in return for a fee contingent upon the value of the property recovered. Pursuant to the contract the taxpayer hired a publicity organization, the
members of which wrote pamphlets, prepared news items and arranged for speeches
and editorial space. After the passage of the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928,2
the taxpayer sought to deduct from its federal income tax return, as "ordinary and
necessary" business expenses, certain sums paid to the publicity organization. The
the terms of the pardon. Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F. (2d) 982, 98V (C.C.A. 6th 194i). Nevertheless, petitioner was granted another pardon upon the condition that he leave the state.
6
United States ex rel. Buchalter v. Lowenthal, io8 F. (2d) 863 (C.C.A. 2d 194o).
Z7United States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13, 17 (1925).
isAs to the methods of obtaining federal review of state decisions, see Nutting, The Supreme Court, the Fourteenth Amendment and State Criminal Cases, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 244,
254-60 (1936).

See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247 (i886).
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 329 (1915).
",N.Y. Times, col. 2, p. 8 (July 6, 1938).
- See Ex parte Frazier, 91 Tex. Crim. 475, 477, 239 S.W. 972, 973
' sFleenor v. Hammond, ii6 F. (2d) 982, 986 (C.C.A. 6th 1941).
'9

20 See

'40

Stat. 411 (1917), 5o U.S.C.A. appendix (1928).

2 45

(1922).

Stat. 254 (1928).

